

PASQUALE ACCARDO

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EDUCATION AND RESEARCH

Research Fellow

April 2021 - Ongoing

University of Turin, Italy

Research project: "Artificial Intelligence in Support of Museums"

Supervisors: Nadia Campaniello, Giovanni Mastrobuoni

PhD in Economics

October 2018 - September 2021 (Expected)

University of Leicester, UK

Research field: Economics of organised crime

Supervisors: Giuseppe De Feo, Sergio Currarini

Oxford Summer School in Economic Networks

June 24-28, 2019

University of Oxford, UK

Funded PGR project

September 2017 - September 2018

University of Strathclyde, UK

Title: "The Long-term Impacts of Criminal Organizations on Institutions and Socio-economic Development: The Case of the Sicilian Mafia."

Supervisor: Giuseppe De Feo

MSc in Economics and Finance

September 2015 - July 2017

University of Naples "Federico II", Italy

Grade: *Summa cum laude*

Dissertation title: "Mafia and Elections: Evidence from Sicily in the *Prima Repubblica*"

Tutor: Giovanni Immordino

Erasmus Plus programme

September 2016 - February 2017

Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany

BSc in Economics

September 2012 - September 2015

University of Naples "Federico II", Italy

Grade: *Summa cum laude*

Dissertation title: "Management control in museums"

Tutor: Alessandra Allini

Erasmus Plus programme

September 2014 - June 2015

Bangor University, UK

PAPERS IN PROGRESS

With a Little Help from My Friends: Political competition with Interest Groups (jointly with Giuseppe De Feo and Giacomo De Luca)
DRAFT AVAILABLE

This paper studies the effect of electoral competition on the demand for mafia services using a special interest politics framework. The study focuses on Italy and builds a theoretical model of intra-party electoral competition between candidates in the context of proportional representation with open lists. The model shows that, when voters can cast a vote for a plurality of candidates, coalitions of candidates are formed and the demand for the support from criminal organisations is relatively low. A comparative statics exercise is performed to analyse the consequence of reducing to one the number of candidates each voter can support. The consequence is that a tougher intra-party competitive environment develops and the demand for mafia support increases. The theoretical predictions of the model are then tested using data from the Italian parliamentary elections in the period 1983-1992. The empirical analysis confirms the theoretical findings.

Organised crime, Elections and Public policies: A Review (jointly with Giuseppe De Feo and Giacomo de Luca)

DRAFT AVAILABLE (About to be submitted for publication as a chapter in a book entitled “A Modern Guide to the Economics of Crime”, edited by Paolo Buonanno, Paolo Vanin and Juan F. Vargas for Edward Elgar Publishing)

This paper provides a review of the recent economic literature on the impacts of organised crime on elections and public policies, from both a theoretical and empirical standpoint.

The Connections between Mafia and Politics: A Network Analysis approach (jointly with Giuseppe De Feo and Giacomo De Luca)

This paper applies Network Analysis to study a network of relationships between mafia members and representatives of public or private institutions (politicians, public officials, policemen, entrepreneurs etc.), in the 1950s-1960s in Sicily. The first part of the work focuses on the network roles of mafia bosses. The second part, by merging information from the network and from the “Maxiprocesso” of Palermo, analyses the impact of mafia connections on the career of politicians.

Organised crime, Waste policy and Health: The Case of Camorra in Naples and Caserta

This paper studies how the presence of criminal organisations having economic interests in the illegal waste trafficking and disposal can damage the health of local communities. The analysis focuses on the case of the Italian provinces of Naples and Caserta, where the “Camorra” clans have been historically established and are deemed to control the waste business, by exploiting a panel of municipalities in 1980-2016. The aim of the empirical investigation is to identify the effect of organised crime on various disease-specific and infant mortality rates when waste policy changes increase the cost of legal waste disposal. The study also looks at the unclear origins of “Camorra”, an hitherto unexplored issue in the economic literature.

TEACHING TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE

ULSB PGR Teaching Training programme

December 2020 - Ongoing

University of Leicester, UK

Introductory Training for PGRs who Teach

December 2017

University of Strathclyde, UK

Economics Network GTA workshop

October 2017

University of Newcastle, UK

Part-time tutor for students

March 2017 - July 2017

University of Naples “Federico II”, Italy

AWARDS AND SCHOLARSHIPS

Research scholarship, University of Leicester, September 2018 - August 2021

Research scholarship, University of Strathclyde, a.y. 2017/2018

Part-time tutorship assignment by the University of Naples “Federico II”, a.y. 2016/2017

UniCredit prize for the three best students of the MSc in Economics and Finance, University of Naples “Federico II”, a.y. 2015/2016

PRESENTATIONS

Networks, Organised Crime and Politics - PhD Conference, University of Leicester, September 2019

“Do ut des”: An empirical study on the connections between mafia and politics - PGR Away Day, University of Strathclyde, March 2018

SOFTWARE SKILLS

R, STATA, MS Office, Gephi, Latex, Matlab

LANGUAGES

Italian - native proficiency
English - professional proficiency

PERSONAL INTERESTS AND ACTIVITIES

Dedicated and passionate Calisthenics practitioner
Football lover, previously a player at competitive level